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Preface
Unemployment in the European Union (EU) is a serious problem that
threatens to disrupt the integration of accession countries, the character of
individual countries, and the continued existence of the EU. According to
Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith, European integration poses a huge
conundrum for European employment because the conventional theory
explaining unemployment in Europe—labor market rigidities—is wrong.
The application of this policy will not cure European unemployment, but
it could destroy the economic promise of the EU for its poorer regions and
the accession countries.
Expanding upon Public Policy Brief no. 72, Galbraith sets forth a con-
crete strategy of earnings convergence for the EU that is compatible with a
high employment strategy and achievable productivity growth. He finds
that countries and regions that are more egalitarian systematically enjoy
more employment; this relationship is in accord with correct principles of
economics. Furthermore, the relationship of inequality to unemployment
in the United States is the opposite of the rigidities framework: in periods
of full employment, pay inequality declines. Pay inequalities, therefore, are
relevant to the theory of labor market adjustment. The European paradox
is that European ideals require convergence, but European policy imposes
divergence,which,if rigorously pursued,will result in declining relative pay
rates in the poor regions of Europe.
A surprising finding is that intersectoral industrial pay inequalities are
larger in Europe than in the United States and that average European
incomes are dramatically more unequal than those in the United States
when measured across continental distances. Measured across the EU–25,
a European cross-regional Gini coefficient is more than twice the analo-
gous value across the United States.6 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
Galbraith calculates the relative growth rates of wage incomes that
would be required to achieve income convergence and reduce the interre-
gional inequalities in the EU to American levels by 2042, the 50th anniver-
sary of the Maastricht Treaty. Convergence policy, he says, is the only way
for Europe to approach full employment without serious inflation, and to
preserve European ideals. Otherwise, the EU faces significant unemploy-
ment, unmanageable internal migration, and social dislocation.
Galbraith suggests that an egalitarian growth policy that raises relative
growth rates in the poorer regions of Europe is the most powerful
medium-term measure for reducing unemployment. He recommends an
expansion of regional funds as well as new instruments that support the
continental integration of social welfare policy. Continental integration,
not flexible labor markets, accounts for America’s relative success against
entrenched structural unemployment (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, and
minimum-wage laws). Galbraith’s other suggestions for effective redistrib-
utive policy include the creation of a European Pension Union, interre-
gional personal income convergence, directly raising the pay and
purchasing power in the nontraded-goods sectors of peripheral Europe,
and building European universities to rival higher education in the United
States. Galbraith notes that monetary policy has a limited role in a conver-
gence strategy, and he supports a major strategic objective that limits the
ability of the European Central Bank to undermine the convergence process.
European policymakers should recognize the true roots of U.S.success
in fiscal federalism and Keynesian economics.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
November 2006The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
The European Paradox 
Why does—why should—any country wish to join the European Union?
The answer is plain: to become European. And what does that mean? If it
means anything,surely the European dream is to be stable,democratic,and
prosperous, with a touch of the “social model” that is supposed to distin-
guish Europe from the United States. This is obvious, and not only that: it
is spelled out explicitly in the founding documents of the union.
For the presently less-prosperous and quite poor regions of the
European Union (EU), especially to the east, becoming European requires
that they catch up, toward the living standards prevailing in the west. It
does not require equality.Living standards in Poland will never equal those
in Germany, because the industrial and financial core of Europe will never
move from Germany to Poland.But the EU,as a project,does require that the
gap between Poland and Germany narrow over time. It also requires that
the dramatic gaps that separate wage levels in Estonia and Bulgaria from
those in Spain or the Czech Republic be narrowed, even as the Spaniards
and Czechs reduce the gaps separating their countries from the truly rich.
This we may call the imperative of income convergence. This brief
explores that imperative over a relatively long time,stretching out to the 50th
anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty in 2042.Will that landmark be truly a
golden jubilee, or will it prove nothing more than a sour footnote in the
record of a failed endeavor? This question is facing Europe today. The
answer will depend, in part, on whether the convergence imperative is rec-
ognized and realized between now and then.
Mathematically,the convergence imperative imposes a simple condition:
growth of wages and incomes must be inversely proportional to present
wage rates. This does not mean the rich must stagnate. It means that
incomes and wages of the rich must grow more slowly than those of the less
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rich, and those of the poor should grow the most rapidly of all. The
achievement of equal growth rates across regions is not good enough.
Equal growth rates preserve proportionate differences, and absolute differ-
ences grow over time.
For some time, the force of foreign direct investment has been bringing
the start of convergence to some of the accession countries of the EU–25;
for instance,the Czech Republic and Hungary.Thanks to appreciating cur-
rencies, wages in these countries have been rising quite rapidly—when
measured in euros. But wage increases are unlikely to complete the job, for
two reasons: investment booms tend to peter out,and once a country joins
the euro zone, exchange rate–based convergence will stop. It has already
stopped in some of the eurozone’s poorer regions, where the convergence
project is also far from complete.
Over the long run,therefore,convergence will not just happen.It must
be made to happen.And that means it must be part of an economic policy
agenda for Europe.
But here we encounter a problem. Consider the economic policy pre-
scription being advanced across Europe, under the unanimous advice of
national governments, the EU, international institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD),the media,and,of course,a phalanx
of economists, most of them safely protected by academic tenure. This is
the project of labor market reform—aimed, it is said, at reducing the mass
unemployment that afflicts so much of Europe today.
Labor market reform follows a logic familiar to every undergraduate
who has ever taken an introductory economics course. Labor markets are
supposed to operate under the guidance of supply and demand, with supply
curves sloping upwards (mostly) and demand curves sloping downwards
(always). If unemployment exists, the cause must lie in a failure of the real
wage to adjust to its equilibrium value. Perhaps technological change and
other factors have cut demand for workers equipped with relatively limited
skills. To restore full employment, wages paid to such workers must fall.
This can be accomplished by weakening unions, cutting job protections
and unemployment benefits,and otherwise dismantling market power that
rash democratic governments have allowed to accumulate in the hands of
the unskilled.1The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
Given that real wages for unskilled work are too high,the remedy must
be to reduce them.Labor market reform is the instrument for this reduction.
Necessarily, the pay gaps separating skilled from unskilled labor must
increase. The program of labor market flexibility envisages kicking the
props out from under worker power in whatever forms it exists. That form
varies from country to country, with some countries (such as Spain and
Italy) favoring job-tenure protections (which do not impose accounting
costs on the state budget),and others (such as Denmark and Sweden) plac-
ing more emphasis on unemployment benefits,training,and a compressed
distribution of wages. To cure unemployment, the authorities and pundits
say, all of this must change.
In the medium term,the project envisages that the EU should become
flexible enough to reach levels of inequality characteristic of a “dynamic”
capitalist economy.For this,many Europeans see a model—when they gaze
across the Atlantic at the United States. Like it or not, the American model
stands as the template for the degree of inequality that must be achieved in
order to enjoy full employment.
A second truism of current economic discussion is globalization.
Everyone knows that the boundaries of the economy are no longer at the
national frontier. We live in a global economy and workers must therefore
face the harsh reality that they compete not only with their compatriots,
but with all workers of similar productivity, wherever they are. This reality
must be doubly true within the confines of the EU, which lacks even the
modest between-country protective barriers of other times and places.
This truism carries a clear implication.We observe,first,that unemploy-
ment and underemployment are typically higher in the peripheral regions
of Europe,including in the accession countries,than in the relatively prosper-
ouscore countries.We observe also that in many of the accession countries,
educational attainment is comparatively low.According to the logic of supply
and demand,this must mean that the productivity of the accession countries
does not justify, or at best barely justifies, the wages that workers make in
those countries. It therefore cannot justify rapid wage increases.
Now consider what could happen when unskilled workers in France
accept pay cuts, as the doctrine of labor market reform dictates that they
must. If workers in Poland fail to follow suit, then in relative terms they
must lose competitiveness vis-à-vis their low-skilled counterparts in France.10 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
If Poland had been attracting jobs from France due to lower unit labor
costs, some of that benefit may be lost. Faced with wage cuts in France and
to maintain position, it follows that the Poles must also reduce their wages
relative to what they would otherwise be.
So speaks the logic of globalization, combined with the logic of labor
market reform. And since low-productivity workers represent a larger share
of the Polish workforce than of the French, wage restraints must be more
widely applied in Poland than in France.A similar logic applies further down
the chain.Unfortunately,the consequence of this logic is divergence and,in
the limiting case, even declining pay rates in the poor regions of Europe.
This is the European paradox.European ideals require convergence.But
European policies impose divergence. Once the present phase of invest-
ment-driven convergence passes, pressure for divergence must fall heavily
on the poorer countries. Of course, pay is the largest part of income, and
income is the most important determinant of living standards. It follows
that the application of labor market reform in Europe must mean slower
growth of incomes and living standards in poorer regions, including the
periphery of old Europe and the accession countries.One is entitled to fear,
especially, that the accession countries will discover that European eco-
nomic policies work to obstruct their rise toward a fully European living
standard.
Actual European policy cannot operate indefinitely in this way. It is
mathematically and humanly certain that unless income gaps between rich
and poor countries continue to decline over the long run, the poor will
increasingly migrate to the rich. Sooner or later, if too little convergence of
incomes occurs between regions,this migration will develop into a full-scale
convergence of populations. For practical economic purposes, the poorer
countries will cease to exist,except as tourist destinations.The richer coun-
tries will become either melting pots—admitting all European citizens to
full political rights—or ethnic oligarchies (modern versions of apartheid
South Africa). In either case, both groups of countries will completely lose
their present characters, for good.
Another possibility, if European economic policy were to follow the
program of labor market reform qua globalization to its end,is that the EU
would disappear. The EU is already politically stagnant. It has lost its grip
on the idealism that it had as recently as 20 years ago, and the union isThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
engendering a nationalist and xenophobic backlash in many places. A les-
son of the past two decades is that, when failed states collapse, the effects
can be economically catastrophic, as they were in the Soviet Union, or vio-
lently catastrophic, as in Yugoslavia. Europe is not yet a state, but it is not
immune to one catastrophic possibility or the other.
For these reasons, I take the position that the European project must
be saved. It must be saved, most of all, from itself. And this means that the
paradox of Europe must be overcome. The question is how to do it. An
answer requires a reexamination of underlying economics. This will be a
surprising exercise for many readers and, perhaps, a difficult one, because
breaking free of the ingrained logic of supply-and-demand economics or
the grip of factual preconceptions is not easy. I will show that this struggle
to escape is not only necessary,but urgent.Contrary to theory,supply-and-
demand economics do not rule the labor market. And in fact, the United
States does not represent the ultimate example of high inequality in its pay
structure, compared to modern Europe.
The Economics of Inequality and Unemployment 
In this section, I document the following propositions:
1. The theory of unemployment underlying the policy doctrine of labor 
market reform is fallacious,and its implication that jobs are purchased
with inequality is incorrect.
2. Across Europe, the opposite relationship holds: countries and regions,
which are moreegalitarian,systematically enjoy lessunemployment.This is
not an anomaly,but entirely in accord with correct principles of economics.
3. The claim that the United States has a more unequal pay structure
than that of Europe is false. All calculations that purport to verify this
claim have been based on comparisons between the entire United
States and individual countries of Europe.These calculations invalidly
compare a large country with many small ones, and they exclude con-
sideration of large inequalities that exist between European countries.
When these inequalities are added in, the pay structure of the United
States emerges as more egalitarian than that of Europe. And the
American pay structure is dramatically more egalitarian when pay is
measured geographically across states and regions.12 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
As widely believed,moving Europe toward American levels of employ-
ment means moving Europe toward American levels of inequality. But to
achieve this goal, inequalities within Europe must be reduced.
This is the resolution of the European paradox. No contradiction
exists between the ideal of European equality and an efficient economic
policy that results in full employment. Nor is there contradiction between
the lessons of U.S. experience, correctly measured, and what is good for
Europe. The contradiction is between the policies that are required and
what, so far, the political, academic, media, and business elites of Europe
have believed.
Moreover, from the 1930s through the late 1990s, the United States
had always achieved higher employment by reducing inequalities in its pay
structure,not by increasing them.Europe can do likewise.The task remains
to adapt this principle and experience effectively in European institutions
and overcome the true rigidities of Europe. The rigidities are not in the
labor markets, but mainly in the credit and financial systems and the pub-
lic sector, and in the failure, so far, to spread purchasing power effectively
across the full extent of the EU.Most of all,the rigidities that must be over-
come exist in the mind-set of European policymakers.
A.Why the Conventional Theory of Unemployment Is Wrong
The problem of unemployment in Europe is vexed by a theory-driven pre-
disposition to blame it on defects of labor market structure and then to go
out in search of particular rigidities to blame.A great part of the economic
literature follows this pattern, but the result has been a wild goose chase.
Repeated attempts by the most committed advocates of the rigidities doc-
trine have failed. National differences of labor market institutions cannot
effectively explain the existing pattern of variations in unemployment.
Garcilazo (2005) provides an exhaustive survey of those differences,
including examination of the underlying data sets used to measure differ-
ences in institutions across European countries. These data sets are of very
low quality and they do not inspire confidence in empirical generalizations
that might be drawn from them.
In a published review of the empirical literature, Baker et al. (2004)
show that the entire power of institutional explanations for unemploymentThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
differences across Europe rests on one fact.It is true that centralized collective
bargaining and union density are associated with unemployment. But the
effect is that stronger unions are associated with less—not more—unem-
ployment. This effect does not support the rigidities doctrine.
The following section presents a simplified discussion of theoretical
issues. It asks whether the conceptual framework within which the preoc-
cupation with rigidities arises—though extremely well known and instinc-
tively accepted by most people—is actually coherent.
To begin, I review the standard theoretical categories of unemploy-
ment, both neoclassical and Keynesian. I then take up an alternative per-
spective, emanating from development economics, with a contribution
from the Swedish school. According to this perspective, unemployment,
intersectoral inequalities,and migration flows are linked.In this alternative
framework, unemployment arises when increasing inequalities induce an
increased search for better jobs (including migration). With minor modi-
fication, these models are applicable to modern Europe and will become
even more so as European integration progresses. The implications are
consistent with what Baker et al. (2004) have already found: egalitarian
policies can reduce unemployment.If further evidence supports the hypoth-
esis, then conclusions must be drawn and the fetish of rigidities should be
abandoned.
Voluntary and Keynesian Unemployment: A Brief Review
In the textbook theory of labor markets, unemployment is voluntary.
Workers may leave their jobs to look for another.They may refuse to work at
the prevailing wage,while looking for better work.Or they may find that some
larger social power—the government or a union—has set the prevailing
wage too high to justify their employment.In the first two instances,unemploy-
ment is a matter of personal choice.In the third,it is a matter of social choice.
The first instance is “frictional”unemployment.Frictional unemployment
is generally supposed to remain at stable background levels for the society as a
whole, but resolve itself for most individual workers after a short time. The
background levels reflect the efficiency of job-search mechanisms and other
institutions, which may be improved by structural reforms and new tech-
nologies.But the case for improvements is rarely considered urgent,and fail-
ure to implement them does not make frictional unemployment involuntary.14 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
Most workers who decline to work at the prevailing wage (the second
instance) are simply nonparticipants in the labor force. But if a worker
actively searches for employment, holding out hope for a higher market
wage than productivity would justify,or pretends to look for work in order
to qualify for an unemployment benefit, the worker may be counted as
unemployed.In certain national systems,an appropriately qualified worker
who has left or lost a job (or seen a contract expire) may register for unem-
ployment insurance or other labor market benefits and, in this way, also
qualify to be counted as unemployed, even if they are not actively seeking
work, but only waiting for work to come to them.
To call this type of unemployment “voluntary” presupposes that the
worker could find work faster at a lower wage. The worker need only be
willing to acknowledge the realities of his/her market value. That the
worker does not do so is hardly anyone else’s fault. One may sympathize
with employers under these conditions,as they cannot attract all the work-
ers they might like at a low-enough wage to make the employment of those
workers profitable to the firm. But it makes little sense to shed tears over
the workers and still less sense to direct policy toward finding them jobs at
the wages they happen to prefer but that their productivity does not justify.
In a market system, one is not entitled to cause one’s employer a loss.
The institutions of the welfare state—in particular, a more generous
system of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits—will logically increase
the level of unemployment associated with the second instance.UI subsidizes
leisure and encourages workers to hold out for a higher wage. If workers
could work at a lower wage, then a reduction in the subsidy to leisure
would be a sufficient condition for a reduction in unemployment. This
model of unemployment thus presupposes that more jobs, in the aggre-
gate, would be offered if wages were lower. It is the model underlying the
recent proposals in France for cut-rate jobs for people under the age of 26.
But if, on the other hand, more jobs in the aggregate are not actually avail-
able at lower wages, reducing UI merely reduces the disposable income of
the unemployed, while cutting wages for certain categories of workers
(such as the young or immigrants) merely substitutes those workers for
others in existing jobs and reduces the aggregate wage bill. (This was the
burden of student and worker objections to the French scheme.) In the real
world, and certainly in Europe, there is essentially no evidence of a supplyThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
response to lower-wage offers; even cut-rate jobs rarely go begging for work-
ers and no one argues that firms have trouble finding employees when they
want them. Therefore, the practical importance of this second instance of
unemployment cannot be very large.
The third instance is more troublesome.It occurs when workers actually
desire to work at the prevailing real wage, but employers do not believe
them to be sufficiently productive to justify that wage,and the normal market
response—namely, the bidding down of wages to an equilibrium level—is
blocked by some barrier in the labor market. Minimum-wage laws and
trade union contracts are standard examples of rigidities thought capable
of producing this effect. Job protections might also have similar effects, if
they permit incumbent workers to force up wages to the point where firms
cannot earn profits by hiring new workers.
In this case, jobs are not on offer. Supply of labor flatly exceeds the
demand.The individual worker cannot find work,even though he/she may
be willing to work for less. The worker may feel frustrated and unhappy.
Nevertheless, a “correct” theoretical statement still holds his/her unemploy-
ment to be voluntary. The worker could have chosen other social arrange-
ments.The unemployed have no one to blame but their stubborn comrades,
who will not accept lower wages in order to permit the creation of jobs.
This is the prevailing form of voluntary unemployment in the imagi-
nation of modern Europe and its media, economists, and policymakers. It
justifies the campaign for “labor market reform.”The authorities and pun-
dits forget, however, that The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money aimed at the third instance and destroyed it on logical grounds.
Writing at a time when unemployment insurance was minimal, John
Maynard Keynes would not have considered my second type of unemploy-
ment worth bothering about. Nor was he much interested in frictions,
which cannot account for joblessness on a mass scale. But the claim that
workers could cure unemployment by accepting a reduction in their wage
rates underpinned the classical response to the Great Depression, just as it
does the neoclassical response to unemployment today.
Keynes pointed out that, since the theory posited a labor market that
cleared in real terms, real wages could be reduced equivalently, either by
reducing money wages or by increasing the money price of wage goods.
The first path could be blocked by strikes against wage cuts (as the French16 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
students and workers recently showed). But the second path could not be
blocked,as workers rarely react to a little inflation.Therefore,so long as the
authorities retained some influence over prices of wage goods,it would not
be difficult to fool workers somewhat by reducing real wages with some
inflation—and cure mass unemployment! Workers’ acceptance of money
wage cuts would not be essential and their resistance to them not decisive.
And it would, of course, be utterly foolish to forego full employment simply
for fear of a minor amount of wage-goods inflation.2
This argument has weaknesses,but Keynes also had a second one,which
rested on the fact of markup pricing. If workers did accept money wage
cuts, there would follow a fall in money prices. The effect of falling prices
would be to obviate the effect on real wages. Thus, Keynes argued that
workers not only did not, but also could not, make a wage bargain in real
terms.Instead,workers merely accept the aggregate volume of employment
offered by employers at a given, conventionally fixed structure of money
wages.This,he argued,is how employment is determined in the real world.
Under these conditions, therefore, the total volume of employment could
be increased very simply: induce employers to offer more jobs at the same
money wages by creating the conditions for greater profit associated with
higher employment. And if that were so, Keynes argued, then previous
unemployment would have to be considered involuntary.
Ever since Keynes, policymakers in the United States have responded
to unemployment as if they believed it to be involuntary. They may, for
instance, cut interest rates or income taxation in order to induce con-
sumers to spend and businesses to invest.Or government may spend more.
Even the most orthodox Republican leader is not above exhorting the
American household to go out and spend in the hopes of reviving aggregate
effective demand and overcoming a temporary shortfall in total employment.
This response is the common practice, but widely overlooked, espe-
cially in Europe. In journals and the media, not to mention the advice
offered by institutes of “wise men” to governments, unemployment is
almost always linked to the flexibility of labor markets, not to demand.
This link is, of course, a euphemism for the ability to cut wages, benefits,
and job protections. Indeed, policies to “reform” labor markets are rou-
tinely announced, and they always fail. The conditioned reflex pronounces
the policies insufficient and more drastic remedies are then prescribed.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
Meanwhile, the theoretical economists of the neoclassical school nowa-
days have not so much rejected Keynes as pretended that his arguments
were never made in the first place.They are much concerned with airbrushing
macroeconomic activism from the pages of history—as Trotsky was disap-
peared by Stalin. Robert Lucas’s 2003 presidential address to the American
Economic Association was in this vein. For these theorists, only more flex-
ibility can reduce unemployment. It is not clear how such thinkers recon-
cile their views with Keynes’s assault on a real wage–clearing labor market,
since they rarely display awareness of the actual content of his critique.
Keynes’s disappearance has been abetted by the behavior of some
economists who purport to be his successors. The rump that holds quasi-
Keynesian policy views (for instance, the doctrine of “efficiency wages”)
tends to favor both expansive demand policy and some measure of “labor
market reform.” The former is to be pursued, especially when the latter is,
for various reasons,impractical.These economists thus face both ways: left
toward budget deficits and low interest rates when necessary, and right
toward “reforms” aimed at rolling back the welfare state. With this group
identified as New Keynesians, there is no influential school of economists
who argue against more flexible labor markets.
Today,Keynes’s own critique of wage flexibility,which rests on the fact
that wages are set in money but not in real terms,remains as valid as it was
in 1936,and so the textbook labor market view of unemployment is plainly
wrong.On the other hand,the quasi-Keynesian position described above is
actually self-contradictory. If increasing labor market flexibility means
lowering wages for low-productivity jobs, as it invariably does, the general
effect will be to increase, rather than decrease, unemployment and to
reduce the effectiveness of expanding aggregate demand.
This view suggests that the correct position is one almost nobody
takes: that increasing wage flexibility has at best nothing to do with reducing
unemployment. On the contrary, equality helps employment and inequality
hurts it. Moreover, appropriate measures to expand the demand for labor
by increasing spending also make labor markets more, rather than less,
egalitarian. They reduce the wage flexibility so prized by commentators
and wise men. Furthermore, measures that reduce inequalities per se also
tend to reduce unemployment. They will have this effect, quite apart from
any impact on aggregate effective demand.318 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
Therefore,all significant forms of unemployment are subject to policy
control, and so they are involuntary in Keynes’s meaning. Unemployment
can generally be reduced, if not eliminated, by the quite simple expedient
of creating jobs at the prevailing wage. The real objection to this policy does
not concern labor market economics, but the politics of empowering and
expanding government to accomplish this goal. It concerns the often dreary
and misdirected character of the work undertaken by government projects
and the interference that inevitably results when private enterprise attempts
to maintain its own spheres of economic activity. These are legitimate
objections. But they are objections best met by imaginative policy design,
to help assure that the new employments actually accomplish something
worth having.Keynesians have long argued that pointless employment was
better than no employment at all, but absolutely nothing in their case pre-
cludes creating good and useful employment for those who are unem-
ployed and underemployed. Keynes himself always argued that this would
be better. Make-work was, for him, never more than a last resort.
Why Flexibility Will Never Cure Unemployment 
Let’s examine the flexibility hypothesis in more depth. Why do people
become unemployed? Unemployment did not exist in preindustrial soci-
ety.Unemployment,as we know it,emerged with the industrial revolution,
took its definition from American statistical practices in the late 19th cen-
tury, and became a mass phenomenon—worthy for the first time of con-
centrated attention from economists—in the Great Depression of the
1930s. Why? 
It makes no sense to point to the creation of UI and similar institu-
tions as a cause for the rise of unemployment. UI was not invented before
unemployment.
Equally clearly,the standard supply-and-demand diagram,with wages
set above the market-clearing levels, cannot account for the emergence of
unemployment in the industrial age.Real factory wages in the 19th century
were not protected by laws or by unions.Real wages were low,as any reader
of Marx or Dickens knows. Moreover, many workers had other options. If
they migrated from Europe to the slums of New York City, they could still
move on, after a short time, to the west. Yet, in many cases, they did not.
Instead, they formed, more or less willingly under the circumstances, theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
“reserve army of the unemployed.”And that army remained, even though
industrial production grew rapidly and the time was not one of depression
or stagnation in output and demand. Why? 
The textbook view holds that even though real wages were very low,
they were nevertheless too high. Since the workers most likely to face
unemployment in this model are those who are the least productive, it fol-
lows that wages for the least productive workers should have fallen,in order
to give each worker a job commensurate with his/her skills. This can only
lead to a greater inequality in wages than existed previously.The calls heard
in Europe for “increased flexibility” today are of the same type. They are
calls for increased pay inequalities, as a direct route toward full employ-
ment equilibrium.
And yet,it is almost always possible (in principle) for an unproductive
worker to let his wages fall.Out-of-work academics know this very well: they
become consultants.Ex-graduate students can wait tables.Secretaries become
temps. Former farm boys can (in the most extreme cases) go back to the
farm. Or they can work off the books, mowing lawns and weeding gardens.
If they do not do so (and many do not) and accept unemployment, it
may be because such inferior jobs stand in the way of one’s chances of find-
ing better work.At any rate,given the existence of an informal sector,drop-
ping wages in the more formal sectors to the levels of the informal sector
cannot be a solution, except insofar as it discourages people from leaving
the informal sector. If productivity is determined by the capital stock
(human and physical) available to workers, then cutting wages only
amounts to a transfer of the surplus from inframarginal workers in the
high-wage sectors to their employers.
In general, the rigidities doctrine supposes that unemployment is the
only choice open to a worker who declines to cut his/her real wage to an
equilibrium level.It supposes,in other words,that the “job”is something only
offered by an “employer.” But this is hardly the normal case. If workers
have the option of self-employment, whether in agriculture or services, or
in the formal or cash economy, then the rigidities framework runs into
trouble.Workers may be “choosing”unemployment over work options that
are open to them, but are unsatisfactory because those options reflect low
productivity when unassisted by capital and large-scale organization.So we
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emergence of unemployment alongside industrialization or the standard
employment practices in a service economy.And we have a neo-Keynesian
alternative that equally overlooks, for the most part, the flow of workers
into and out of the industrial workforce.
The neo-Keynesian theory is concerned, mainly, with the unemploy-
ment of workers who,at the outset,are already committed to industrial life.
A satisfactory theory of unemployment,on the other hand,must deal with
a world in which the options of organized and informal employment both
exist. It must be valid for the developing (which is to say, preindustrial and
industrializing) countries and also for the postindustrial world. Indeed, it
is only when both types of employment are recognized explicitly that one
can make sense of the phenomenon of unemployment and the empirical
relationship between unemployment and pay.
A More General Theory of Unemployment and Inequality 
Suppose we find ourselves in a preindustrial society. A highly egalitarian
peasant agriculture prevails (presupposing an abundance of free land),and
there is no welfare state.(Imagine the United States,outside the South,in the
late 18th century.) Each worker lives according to his/her abilities and the for-
tunes of the soil.No one leaves employment except to search,very purpose-
fully, for better land. In this egalitarian state, unemployment does not exist.
Now, suppose we find ourselves in a workers’ paradise of industrial
socialism. Once again conditions are egalitarian, not because of an abun-
dance of land, but because of the philosophy of those with state power.
Education, health care, child care, and housing are likewise provided for
free. Workers all have jobs if they want them. Part of the reason for this—
lax management, lack of a profit motive, and overstaffing on the factory
floor—is well known.But the other part is that workers have no incentive to
leave their present employment and look for better work (except by emigrat-
ing).They cannot improve their economic circumstances materially by trying
to change their jobs. So why do it? As in the first case, unemployment does
not exist. Therefore, the intermediate cases are those that cause the trouble.
A half century ago, Simon Kuznets argued that inequality would rise
in the early stages of economic development and transition to industrial
growth. The reasons were concrete. New urban centers were places of con-
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centers and those in the countryside became significant as cities grew; and
that disparity would only decline later as the proportion of the population
remaining in the countryside shrank.This dynamic was not the entirety of the
theory behind Kuznets’ famous inverted-U relationship between income
and inequality, but it was surely the most significant single factor.
John Harris and Michael Todaro offered a model that captured these
characteristics in a neoclassical paper aimed mainly at development econ-
omists (Harris and Todaro 1970). In the model, workers migrate from a
low marginal-product rural sector to cities, where minimum wages are
imposed, and accept a high probability of sustained unemployment, in
exchange for a low probability of getting better-paying jobs. The equilib-
rium condition is that the expected value of the gain is equal to the cost
incurred in leaving rural employment; this condition entails substantial
equilibrium unemployment.
From this, a positive monotonic relationship between inequality and
unemployment emerges.As development starts,the riches of the city become
magnets for the rural poor. No one on the farm can find an urban indus-
trial job without pulling up stakes and heading to the city. Everyone with
initiative does this, particularly if a shock to farm incomes suddenly makes
the inequality worse.
But the number of jobs cannot keep up. And so, no matter how rap-
idly cities grow, mass unemployment is inevitable for a time. It will only
end when the rural population is absorbed or emigrates.It can only be con-
tained (as in modern China) by a pass system regulating who may live in
the cities.And it can only be regulated effectively by measures that provide
strong incentives to stay in the countryside or in the smaller cities and
towns.(Social security systems,which provide common money incomes to
retirees and therefore higher real incomes to those living where staples are
cheap, are an example of such an incentive, one that works effectively to
this purpose in the United States.) 
While Harris and Todaro focused on East Africa,their argument is also
adaptable for postagricultural societies,which have elites in technology and
finance,a core of manufacturing workers,and a large reservoir of workers in
services. The elites live off the fat of the land; access to their jobs is restricted
by cartels and credentialing. The same is not true for manufacturing workers
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mine the profit positions of firms they work for. (This is known as indus-
try-specific labor rent.) Service workers enjoy no such advantages, and their
pay is largely set by the social minimums of the welfare state. They are like
the earlier generation of farm workers in most relevant economic respects,
and they may be considered a “reserve army of the underemployed.” So
long as the differentials between service and manufacturing wages are fairly
small,or it is possible to search for better jobs for minimal cost while work-
ing, service workers may not abandon current employment to seek better
employment. Still, if the situation becomes sufficiently desperate, they will
do so. In this case, measured unemployment will rise because underem-
ployment will come out in the open.
The choice facing younger workers is especially stark, since a worker
entering the low-wage service sector may be “typed” as unambitious and
low in productivity. Such a worker cannot make the transition later as eas-
ily as a worker who has never been employed at all. For this reason, young
people have an incentive to resist taking bad employment for as long as
possible; therefore, youth unemployment in unequal societies is expected
to be an especially serious problem. And unemployment overall will be
worse, other things equal, in societies with younger populations.
From the standpoint of the individual worker,the decision to risk unem-
ployment depends on two parameters: the difference between current
income and the hoped-for improvement,and the probability of attaining that
improvement.The former can be measured by the inequality of wages.The
greater the existing inequality, the greater the potential rewards. The latter
depends in part on the rate at which new, higher-wage employments are
offered.Thus the worst case for unemployment would be in an unequal soci-
ety experiencing the early phases of a boom or otherwise hopeful moment
(Spain in the 1970s comes to mind). Growth over time absorbs the unem-
ployed,but if growth first accelerates and then fails,a higher long-term rate
of unemployment can result. The “best”case for unemployment may be in
a slow-growth society as a long period of equalizing expansion comes to an
end. Here, the United States in early 2000 offers a compelling example.
To reiterate, as outlined above, pay inequality causes unemployment.
Unequal societies should have more unemployment than egalitarian soci-
eties. Mobility barriers across regions will help determine how far workers
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found.Thus,in the relatively unified United States,with a single federal UI
system, one would expect the highest unemployment in or around the
richest places. In Europe, where welfare states remain national and the loss
from moving across national frontiers is relatively high, one might expect
the unemployed of Poland, for example, to congregate in Poland.
Is their unemployment voluntary or involuntary? In this theory, the
distinction has lost its meaning, for it is purely a matter of perspective.
From the standpoint of the individual worker, there is always a choice—to
risk unemployment or not to risk it.In this sense,unemployment is volun-
tary.But,at the same time,from the larger standpoint of society,the aggre-
gate volume of unemployment is endogenous. And at least one critical
variable—the inequality of the wage structure—is subject to policy con-
trol. Since unemployment can be reduced by policy without changing the
underlying preferences of the workforce, then, by Keynes’s definition, it is
involuntary, in spite of having been individually chosen.
In this model,unemployment is a positive function of (a) inequality in
the structure of pay,(b) the immediate growth rate of higher-wage employ-
ments (not necessarily that of the economy overall),and (c) the proportion
of the population below a certain age. One may add a variable (d) for that
part of the youth population held off the labor market altogether because
of college,military service,or even prison.Any of these “holding pens”may
ease the problem of long-term unemployment. The first two allow young
people to remain off the labor market, without stigma, until they can find
suitable employment.The third,for most people,removes hope for any but
menial employments following release from detention.
Finally, a dynamic element may be added to the discussion. I draw on
Meidner and Rehn (1951),whose work underpinned the conceptualization
of the Swedish model. They pointed out another consequence of inegali-
tarianism in the structure of pay:it permits technologically backward firms
to maintain competitiveness, despite higher unit costs, by paying their
workers less than more progressive firms. Thus a high degree of inequality
in the wage structure would be associated with a weak degree of technological
dynamism and,over time,a lower average productivity and standard of liv-
ing than would otherwise be the case.
Deliberate compression of wage differentials puts the technological lag-
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policies (providing retraining for displaced workers) and a policy of strong
aggregate demand, the end result can be an expansion of capacity by the
technologically progressive firms. Some of the unemployed can then be
absorbed in the expanding, advanced industries. And many more can be
maintained in subsidized, low-productivity employment—either public or
nominally private sector—essentially paid for by the surplus created in the
high-productivity firms.In this way,egalitarian societies enjoy efficient use
of all their labor resources, high absolute living standards, and competitive
advantages over societies that allow markets to adjust wages to an existing
structure of relative productivities.
To contrast this model of employment and unemployment with the
rigidity-flexibility framework, one need only be reminded that the alterna-
tive to good employment is not only unemployment, which is what the
framework supposes, but it can also be bad employment (perhaps in some
other place or occupation).Bad employment in the informal sector is never
precluded,anywhere,by labor market institutions.The differences between
the available alternatives are what matter. Some people—not all—will
choose unemployment if it provides at least some chance of jumping the
gap to a better-paid job.The greater the gap,the more tempting it is to take
the risk, and the higher the unemployment.
In short summary, it is not just that full employment tends to reduce
inequality. It is also that inequality produces unemployment. The more
unequal the structure of pay facing an individual worker, the greater the
likelihood that the worker will choose the lottery of unemployment over
the certainty of an impoverished and miserable life.
Inequality, however, is a feature of society. It is not a characteristic of
the individual, but of the environment within which the individual lives.
And this raises a question of crucial importance that is entirely overlooked
in the literature. What are the boundaries of the environment? Are they
purely local? Are they national? Or are they continental in scope? 
This is a subjective matter, but it is clear that, as economic barriers fall
between regions and countries, and as communications improve and dis-
crimination decreases, individual prospects must necessarily expand. This
process has been going on in Europe for 50 years—it is in many ways the
essence of European integration.And given the theoretical proposition just
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diately obvious that European integration poses a huge conundrum for
European employment.
For the further one looks in any direction across Europe,the greater the
inequality one observes.It follows that the more Europe integrates,the greater
the problem of unemployment,unless drastic measures are taken to reduce inter-
regional inequalities.This is the basic economic logic of a convergence strategy.
B.Inequality and Unemployment in Europe
So far, we have argued that inequality of wage rates helps to govern the rate
of unemployment. This brings up a point of method, often overlooked,
which is of central importance to the problem of unemployment in Europe
today: Inequality over what range? The town? The province? The country?
Or Europe as a whole? And if the latter,what is Europe,exactly? What is the
effect of expanding the sphere of European economic integration on the
inequalities experienced and perceived by Europeans? 
The importance of this question stems from the fact that Europe expe-
riences different levels of inequality at different levels of geographic aggre-
gation. In many parts of the continent, local or national inequality is low.
Scandinavians and Germans take pride in the economic equality within
their borders, and with reason. However, wage differentials between
European countries are high.Average income (in nominal terms and com-
mon currency units) in Spain is only about 60 percent of that in
Germany—comparable to the average differential between American
blacks and whites.It follows that making a correct prediction of the unem-
ployment rate expected from any given level of inequality depends criti-
cally on drawing analytical boundaries in an economically and socially
relevant way. In principle, we must gauge inequality across the geographic
and political range of individuals. And this problem is complicated by the
fact that, at a given moment in time, different groups may experience dif-
ferent geographic (as well as occupational) horizons.
Conceição, Ferreira, and Galbraith (CFG) (1999) showed that there
was an uncanny negative correlation,on the order of -0.8,between European
GDP per capita and rates of unemployment from the late 1970s to the early
1990s (when the collapse of Eastern markets upset it). If every country were
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could not exist. National labor markets would have cleared separately, and
there would be no association between national productivity and national
unemployment.But the relationship did exist.Indeed,the relationship was
highly systematic, excepting only those nations (notably Portugal) that
solved unemployment in large part by exporting their unemployed.
In this sense, Poland today is no longer an independent labor market
but a province of greater Europe.The unemployed are not the unemployed
merely of Poland, but the unemployed of all Europe. They are not only the
low-wage workers seeking to escape the countryside for Warsaw or Krakow,
but also the low-wage workers who cannot find jobs across the vast differ-
entials separating Poland from Germany. Today, they may live in Poland
because barriers to international mobility still exist, or they have not yet
located jobs, or they don’t qualify for German welfare. If one has to be
unemployed, then it is better to be jobless near home. But if international
inequalities are not steadily reduced, a new wave of emigration from the
peripheries into the center of Europe is inevitable. At that point, both
Poland and Germany would cease to be national units in their present
sense. They would become merely geographic boundaries with wholly
floating populations—as is the case today for U.S. states—except that they
would lack the easy political integration enjoyed by mobile Americans.
CFG also found that,in general,European countries with less inequal-
ity enjoy more employment. This suggests that national frontiers remain
the relevant ones for some substantial part of the employable population.
An interesting test of this view came with German reunification. Both East
and West Germany were highly egalitarian internally before 1989, and nei-
ther suffered especially high unemployment by European standards. They
were, however, rigidly separated from each other. The difference in average
income levels between east and west was so large that unification created,
almost instantaneously,a much more unequal country.The model predicts
that the equilibrium unemployment rate would rise on this account alone.
And, sadly, so it did.
Galbraith and Garcilazo (GG) (2004) extended this work by introduc-
ing new measures of inequality across 159 European provinces annually for
15 years, and showing the degree of inequality within provinces and the
degree to which each province contributed to inequality in Europe as a
whole. Their findings are consistent with CFG and with the theory thatThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 27
regions with lower inequality and higher average incomes enjoy systemat-
ically less unemployment across Europe. GG also show that, on balance,
institutional differences between the major countries of continental
Europe (except Spain before the recent decline in unemployment there
and, to a very modest extent, the United Kingdom and Netherlands) are
not major predictors of differences in average unemployment rates. These
findings are all inconsistent with the national labor market–rigidities
framework that has, up until now, dominated the debate over unemploy-
ment in Europe.
In sum, both national and provincial measures of inequality support
an augmented version of the Harris-Todaro view that unemployment
depends on the expected value of gain from accepting a ticket to search for
higher wages. It is equally consistent with the CFG view of social demo-
cratic anti-unemployment policy—the wealthy countries avoid unemploy-
ment most effectively, not by liberalizing their labor markets, but by
subsidizing low-productivity workers to stay in their jobs. As CFG argued,
the efficiency gains from this strategy can be astonishingly large and propel
an egalitarian country with mediocre productivity, such as Denmark, into
the forefront of the world competition for a high standard of living.
C.The Case of the United States
In the opening section of this brief, I wrote of a widespread European belief:
the American model stands as the template for the degree of inequality that
must be achieved in order to enjoy the American level of full employment.
I endorse this belief. It furnishes a precise and agreed-on point of depar-
ture for the following empirical inquiry.
In my judgment, the forces that determine employment must operate
on similar principles everywhere. For example, in a given state of technol-
ogy, there must be a particular relationship between pay inequality and
unemployment. I see no compelling reason why this relationship should
differ between the United States and Europe. It follows that there likely
does exist an “optimal” structure of pay inequality associated with maxi-
mum employment. Since the American employment experience is plainly
better—a point no one disputes—it follows that good employment policy
for Europe would seek levels of pay inequality characteristic of those found28 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
in the United States. I shall turn in due course to the surprising implica-
tions of this statement.
But first,what is the relationship of inequality to unemployment in the
United States? Ample evidence suggests that it is the opposite of the rigidi-
ties-framework prediction. In periods of high unemployment, American
inequality in pay structures increased. In periods of full employment, pay
inequality declined. A consistent measure of manufacturing-pay inequali-
ties on a monthly basis since 1947 tracks the monthly unemployment
record so closely that the two series would appear to be drawn from the
same statistical distribution.Whatever else one may say about this,it is not
consistent with a wage-adjusting view of vicissitudes of unemployment.
Figure 1 illustrates this finding. The measure of pay inequality is the
between-groups component of Theil’s T-statistic computed across 17 indus-
trial categories in the United States for which consistent monthly data are
available starting from January 1947.4 The variable observed is average
weekly earnings in the category. The association with the monthly unem-
ployment rate for the country is far too close to be coincidental. The evi-
dence of a positive relationship between pay inequalities and unemployment















































































Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor StatisticsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 29
is bad news for the neo-Keynesian effort to claim a role for labor market
flexibility as an auxiliary to increasing demand. A hallmark of the neo-
Keynesian effort is a strict separation between questions of distribution,
which are reserved to microeconomics, and questions of total effective
demand. Only the latter remains within the macroeconomist’s province. An
increase in labor flexibility and wage inequality (in the face of “skill-biased
technological change”) is, to this point of view, a micro measure that
should improve employment prospects.Accordingly, evidence should exist
that increasing inequalities lead to higher employment—but it doesn’t.The
finding that full employment is systematically egalitarian in distributive
effect controverts the thesis.
By now, readers will be objecting on the common sense ground that
“everyone knows” that overall American society is grotesquely unequal,
while Europeans retain values of solidarity, which impart rigidities to their
wages. So how can this argument possibly reconcile low unemployment in
the United States with high unemployment in Europe? 
Part of the answer is that the relevant inequalities are of wages, the
reward for work.They do not include inequalities of other forms of income,
including income from property and capital. In the American case, meas-
urement is contaminated by a very wide range of highly unequal, nonwage
incomes. Moreover, those inequalities grew dramatically in the late 1990s,
in particular, and they were a function of the speculative bubble at that
time. Capital gains were intensely concentrated by industry and location.
As Galbraith and Hale (2003) show, the between-counties component of
the surge in income inequality in the late 1990s was accounted for entirely
by increasing income in just five of 3,150 counties overall: New York, New
York; King County, Washington (Seattle); and three counties in northern
California (Santa Clara, San Francisco, and San Mateo).
Schmitt and Zipperer (2006) report that, according to the Luxembourg
Income Studies, pretax, pretransfer income inequality in the United States
in 2000 was not higher than in typical European countries. The U.S. value
was around 0.45,while the range for Europe was 0.39 to 0.50.Only after one
takes account of taxes and transfers in measures of post-tax, post-transfer
income does the United States rise to the top of the inequality tables.But it
is the pretax, pretransfer measure that reflects pay.30 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
Pay inequalities, finally, can be measured directly and are relevant to a
theory of labor-market adjustment. Comparable measures of industrial
pay inequality for Europe and the United States can be drawn from the
OECD’s Structural Analysis (STAN) data set; the relevant calculations were
made by CFG. They show that inequalities in industrial pay, measured
across sectors in the United States, are comparable to the upper end of the
national European range.They are not materially higher than in,say,Spain
or Italy. And when one takes account of the large differentials between
European country averages, intersectoral industrial pay inequalities are
actually larger in Europe than in the United States.5
Figure 2, taken from CFG, shows inequality in manufacturing pay
measured across sectors within and between European countries and com-
pared to the United States. Looking only at manufacturing pay within
countries from 1986 to 1992,the United States was as egalitarian as Europe.
However, adding in the between-countries component radically worsens
the European position in the comparison.
In this brief,I present an even more direct and updated comparison of
between-regions pay inequalities using measures of total payroll and total
employment for 215 European regions and all 50 U.S.states,plus the District
of Columbia. The measures are made comparable by presenting them in
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the form of Gini coefficients,which are calculated on the artificial assump-
tion that every person within a state or region enjoys the same average
income. This comparison is not, nor is it intended to be, a full comparison
of inequalities within the United States or across Europe. However, for a
theory of unemployment,interregional inequalities are particularly impor-
tant.They measure,quite directly,the incentive for long-distance economic
migration and, therefore, the incentive to expose oneself to the risk of
unemployment in order to gain the possibility of a high-income job. By
comparison, inequalities within close geographic quarters may represent
nothing more than the incentive to commute (e.g., by train between the
suburbs and downtown Paris,or by subway from the Bronx to Manhattan).
Viewing this comparison, the results are quite striking. A European
cross-regional Gini coefficient is about 0.235, or more than twice the value
across the American states (0.101).To check the comparison,I reduced the
number of regions in the European calculation to American values by com-
puting a separate Gini across every fourth region, and averaging the coef-
ficients for the four such cohorts. The coefficient is essentially identical to
the previous one. There are other ways of aggregating European regions to
achieve comparable values for Europe and the United States, but I believe
that they would not alter the basic conclusion. Across continental dis-
tances, average European incomes are dramatically more unequal than are
those in the United States.6
It does not necessarily follow from this that living standards in Europe are
more unequal than those in the United States. Cost-of-living indexes tend
to be geographically specific.The United States has large income differentials
among populations living close to each other (e.g.,blacks and whites in major
cities) but exposed to roughly comparable living costs. In Europe, the differ-
entials are much greater between regions and countries—the east and south
experience much lower incomes,but also lower living costs,than the north
and west. For this reason, the lived experience of a given nominal inequal-
ity may be harsher in the United States than in Europe and this probably
accounts for the common perception that life is less fair in America.
For the purposes of a theory of unemployment, however, differences in
nominal earnings matter,not real living standards.For a person contemplating
long-distance migration, a key consideration is whether the nominal
income available in a rich country can provide a decent living standard,not32 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
in the rich country but in the poorer region whence the migrant comes and
where his/her family likely remains. Typically, migrants are willing to
endure cramped and deprived conditions in their place of work, precisely
in order to maximize the incomes sent back to their homes,where purchas-
ing power is magnified by low living costs. Hence, nominal inequalities—
for example, between Andalucia and Madrid, the Algarve and Paris, or
Poland and Frankfurt—drive both the competition for low-skilled jobs in
the rich regions and, to a very substantial extent, the unemployment rates.
Furthermore, one can reasonably expect that cost-of-living differentials
across Europe will decline over time. As markets continue to integrate, the
traded-goods components of living costs will tend to equalize,leaving only
the nontraded-goods components—whose price levels depend on local
wage levels (including rents) and the intangible elements of the living stan-
dard—as separating the costs of living in richer and poorer regions of
Europe.Absent convergence of nominal wages, convergence of living costs
will produce further divergence of real living standards. Convergence pol-
icy must, therefore, deal with nominal differentials, as expressed in the
common currency unit. It is, above all, a matter of money, and particularly
of the money wage.
The Mechanics of Convergence
In this section,I present the results of a calculation of relative growth rates of
wage incomes that are required to achieve a degree of convergence across the
European regions.My chosen objective is to reduce the degree of interregional
inequality across Europe to American levels by 2042, the 50th anniversary
of the Maastricht Treaty.
The point of the exercise is to illustrate, under certain assumptions,
what the relative annual growth rates of wages in each European region
would have to be in order to meet my objective. For the exercise, I use
Eurostat’s REGIO data set for 215 European regions. Average wages are
computed for 16 economic sectors in each region. The sectors are listed in
Table A1. The year 2000 is the latest year that data for all 16 industrial sec-
tors are available at the NUTS 2 regional level (except in Germany, where
regional data are only available at the NUTS 1 regional level for eight
industrial sectors).7The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 33
I make the following assumptions and impose the following restric-
tions.First,I assume that the present hierarchy of relative incomes between
sectors of each European region will remain strictly unchanged (there are
3,062 “region-sector cells”). I also assume that the richest cells will remain
the richest,the poorest will remain the poorest,and that all cells will retain
their present exact position in the ranking of average incomes.My purpose
is not to overthrow any hierarchy, but merely to reduce the differentials
between them.
Second, I assume that present gaps between region-sector cells will
remain exactly proportionate. My method is to reduce the proportionate
gap between each cell and the one below it by exactly the same (very small)
differential each year. I then calculate the compound growth rate required
to advance each cell by exactly that amount.
Third, I assume that the richest region-sector cells (consisting largely
of mining and utility workers in Germany) experience zero real-wage
growth between now and 2042. This is an artificial assumption that can be
relaxed by allowing workers in these cells to enjoy any given base rate of
wage increase that the productivity of the whole economy can afford.
Setting a zero base for the best-paid sectors merely enables one to see most
clearly what the relative growth rates in the poorer regions must be in order
to achieve a given degree of convergence.
Fourth, I assume no structural change in the balance of employment
in any region between now and 2042. This is, again, purely artificial. In the
next section, I suggest policies that violate the assumption and foster an
increasing share of better-paid employments. But the assumption is neces-
sary at this stage to keep calculations tractable and their meanings clear.
Having calculated a path for wages in each region-sector cell for each
year from 2007 to 2042, I then add up the sectors within regions to obtain
new values for average pay in each region. Average pay is obtained by tak-
ing the ratio of total compensation of employees (including wages and
salaries, plus employers’ social contributions) and total employment for
the region, assuming a fixed sectoral composition of employment. Thus I
compute a pretax, pretransfer measure of average pay measured in thou-
sands of euros per year.
From this value, I can compute the Gini coefficient of pay inequality
across regions in 2042. I set this value to the desired level (correspondingFigure 3 Distribution of Growth Rates of Real Average Annual Pay Required
to Meet Convergence Criteria between 2007 and 2042,by Region*
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to the American value in 2000) and adjust the convergence parameter,
which governs the pace at which the earning structure is compressed, until
I achieve the desired degree of inequality on the target date.
The results are given in detail in Table A2 in the appendix and shown
in Figure 3. The table gives the annual compound growth rate of average
wages for each region that is required to achieve an American degree of
regional earnings convergence by 2042. The map in Figure 3 shows the
broad outlines of the strategy in geographic terms (excluding Denmark).If
we desired to give additional gains to the sectors presently at the top of the
European pay ladder, then meeting the convergence targets would require
comparable acceleration of wage gains further down the ladder.
Would the wage gains in the poorer regions of a converging Europe be
inflationary? They would clearly have the effect of raising the prices of non-
traded goods in the low-cost regions and the associated land rents.However,
following the Meidner-Rehn formula,they would also raise productivity in the
regions, and there is no reason to expect that costs would rise more than
productivity.In the U.S.experience in the late 1990s,productivity rose pari
passu with employment,as firms facing labor shortages sought and discovered
new ways to improve their use of labor. There was no employment-driven
inflation.For Europe,I calculate that the average rate of wage gain between
2006 and 2042 implied by my convergence parameters is about 3.5 percent.
This is only slightly above historically achieved rates of productivity growth
at high employment,and perfectly achievable when the increases areconcen-
trated in low-income regions with productivity catch-up potential.
Since convergence per se has no effect on the prices of traded goods
produced in the high-wage,high-productivity regions,there is no reason to
expect that it would affect traded-goods prices and, therefore, the conven-
tional measures of price inflation in traded goods.Nor should convergence
induce any wage spirals among workers in richer countries, so long as the
purposes of policy were well understood, agreed upon, and respected in
practice. Convergence is not designed to catapult Spain, say, ahead of
France: its purpose is only to reduce the gap between them.
Convergence would raise effective demand emanating from the low-
wage regions.It would raise the demand for traded goods produced elsewhere
in Europe, and therefore help to absorb unemployed labor in the traded-
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service employment in the converging countries, absorbing labor in situ at
increasingly tolerable and ultimately attractive wages. Convergence would
reduce incentives to economic migration and reduce pressures on labor sup-
ply in the richer countries,even as unemployment fell in the poorer regions.
At the end of the day,Europe would approach full employment in har-
mony and solidarity, without serious inflation. With confidence that this
policy can, in fact, succeed at that objective, opposition to broadening the
scope of European integration and governance should melt away.A conver-
gence policy, I suggest, is the only way to achieve this goal and preserve the
European ideal in the face of debilitating challenges of unemployment,
immigration,and social dislocation that are attendant on the manifest fail-
ure of European economic policy so far.
The Policies of Convergence
Hurricane Katrina and the destruction of New Orleans have exposed the
folly of the American model, as commonly understood, for Europeans.
Having abandoned planned public-capital investment—not merely under
George Bush but over 30 years—the United States finds itself unprotected
from a well-predicted natural disaster, unable to stage an effective urban
evacuation,and with impaired capacity to plan and execute reconstruction.
Meanwhile, fiscal federalism in the stricken region led to public sector
bankruptcy and a collapse of services, to the point where for a time local
authorities could not even detain, let alone prosecute, thieves, murderers,
and rapists. Even a year later, some evacuees found themselves stranded in
hotels and shelters across the country with their homes ruined, finances in
tatters, and futures in doubt.
To the extent that the drive for labor market reform in Europe is pred-
icated on shallow comparison with the United States, these developments
should signal a profound reexamination of assumptions.Do free and flex-
ible labor markets imply, in part, the abandonment of cherished national
and regional construction projects? Given the obvious linkage between
wage rates and tax revenues,clearly they do: impoverished workers cannot
easily support expensive public works.But public works are integral to the
identity and even to the survival of Europe.Should the game of labor mar-
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defunding the Dutch levees? Few Europeans would consider that worth
the candle.
Nevertheless, Europeans would be mistaken to swing to the view that
America’s experience has nothing to offer in the way of useful ideas against
mass unemployment. It was only five years ago that the United States
achieved full employment, including a high labor force participation rate,
measured unemployment rates below 4 percent for three years in a row, and
recorded low unemployment and poverty among ethnic minorities.
America achieved this with negligible price inflation. The question is: how? 
The answer cannot be found in the hypothesis of labor market flexi-
bility. This hypothesis holds that wages are adjusted to equate marginal
productivity to pay. It implies that, in the run-up to full employment, the
United States should have experienced increasing inequality in the struc-
ture of earnings or pay.Yet this was not the case.Although income inequality
rose,the inequality was due almost entirely to the rise in capital incomes—
to the cash flow immanent in the technology boom. As we have seen, pay
inequalities relevant to the labor market declined.
The same principle holds across Europe in cross-section. To summa-
rize GG (2004), regions with lower inequality in pay structures exhibit sys-
tematically lower rates of unemployment. More broadly, much of the
variation of European unemployment can be accounted for by inequalities
within and between regions, by differential growth rates, and by the share
of youth in total population. Much of the remainder is due to variations
common to all European regions, prima facie evidence of the importance
of continental macroeconomic control. In more recent work, GG (2005)
show that, as unemployment declined across Europe in the late 1990s,
inequality also declined.
The implications for the general design of unemployment policy are
straightforward. Anything that will reduce the inequality of European
wages will help reduce chronic unemployment. So will targeted measures
that provide prelabor market opportunities for young people, enabling
them to time their entry into paid employment so as to escape being tarred
as long-term unemployed. So would anything that increases rates of growth
in a targeted way.
But what specific policies will do the work that must be done? One
must be careful.Would raising the minimum wage in Germany to a higher38 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
fraction of the average, for example, be an effective way to reduce inequal-
ities (and therefore unemployment) in Europe? It would not.For the inter-
sectoral differences within the labor markets of the German Lande are not
among the most significant in Europe. In fact, these regions are already
among Europe’s lowest inequalities.
Pay inequality in Europe is of a different kind.Within individual regions,
it is highest where middle-class jobs (usually associated with manufactur-
ing industry and robust service employment at good wage rates) are scarce
or absent. Structural unemployment festers in Europe’s dualistic regional
economies, where a few good jobs are in the mix with many undesirable
ones. These economies exist mainly on the European periphery and very
extensively among the accession countries.An even larger source of overall
inequality is between these regions and the rich regions of the European
center. Raising minimum wages in Germany does nothing to create middle-
class jobs in the periphery or relieve the difference separating average wage
levels in Germany from those of Poland or Spain.
It follows that an egalitarian growth policy—with directed measures to
raise relative growth rates in the poorer regions of Europe—would be the sin-
gle most powerful medium-term measure for the reduction of European
unemployment. Some instruments for this policy already exist. Regional
funds are a proven, powerful tool, especially for smaller countries. They
could and should be expanded.But they are limited by the capacity of direct
state action. They are also strongly biased toward infrastructure improve-
ments (which pay high wages) and therefore limited in their effect onemploy-
ment. They are not by themselves sufficient; new instruments are required.
The practical steps that would generate convergence within Europe
involve personal income.The EU has left social welfare policies to member
states—and the inequalities in their economic positions are perpetuated by
this decision.This is the problem that policy innovation must now begin to
address. Interregional personal income convergence is one key to less
inequality and fuller employment in Europe. The direct route is the most
efficient way to achieve convergence—by contriving to raise the incomes of
Europe’s poor (measured on the continental scale and consisting largely of the
residents of low-income regions) more rapidly than the incomes of the rich.
This is an old story in the United States. The Deep South (the old
Confederacy) was much poorer than any other region except AppalachiaThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 39
until recent times, and marked by much deeper unemployment. Periodic
crises, such as the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, sparked mass migration—the
Okies and Arkies to California,and the blacks from Mississippi and Alabama
to Chicago and Detroit.These migrations eventually spurred projects directed
toward national economic convergence.
In the New Deal, the United States began the process of federalizing
the welfare state. Social Security and a continental minimum wage came
into being in the 1930s.A national industrial development policy grew out
of deliberate federal investment decisions during wartime mobilization in
the 1940s. A national transportation network was built in the 1950s.
Federally funded health care for the elderly and the poor (Medicare and
Medicaid) was achieved in the 1960s.Even Richard Nixon’s administration
contributed General Revenue Sharing (although this program alone did
not survive the Reagan counterrevolution of the 1980s and no further
progress has been made since that time). Nevertheless, the continental
integration of social welfare policy in the United States today is much far-
ther along than in Europe (e.g., the Deep South and Appalachia are no
longer especially poor).Continental integration,not flexible labor markets,
accounts for America’s relative success against entrenched structural
unemployment.
As economic integration now encompasses all of Europe,the EU needs
to follow the earlier American example. More social democracy and a
more unified social democracy is the answer to European unemployment.
The EU must identify specific measures and prove the model with bold
experiments.
One useful,practical step that is fully consonant with economic justice
would be the creation of a European Pension Union,which would move the
base incomes of the elderly toward convergence. There is no just reason why
the retired elderly in the poor countries of a unified Europe should be paid on
the income standard of their own nation and suffer the indignity of poverty
in old age, compared to fellow Europeans who worked no harder or longer
than they did. Minimum pensions should be set on a standard governed by
the average productivity of Europe as a whole, and any differentials should
be paid to individuals by direct transfers through the EU.
There is also no just reason why unskilled pay differentials across
Europe should be allowed to remain as large as they are. The street sweepers40 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
and news vendors of Portugal are no less productive than those of
Germany (except possibly by virtue of inferior equipment). The EU could
inaugurate a “topping up” scheme for low-wage employees in the poor
regions, along the lines of the American Earned Income Tax Credit. This
too would slow economic dislocation and reduce the incentive to migrate,
by directly raising pay and purchasing power in the nontraded-goods sectors
of peripheral Europe.
No one would wish Europe to emulate American rates of military
enlistment or incarceration. But our rates of enrollment in higher educa-
tion—now up to about half of high school graduates (and higher in some
places, such as California)—are another matter. The investment required
to improve European performance in education would mobilize resources
in the lower-income areas, while sharply reducing the incidence of youth
joblessness by converting the unemployed into students, as does the
United States. Let Europe, therefore, fund and build European universities
on a scale and of a quality to rival higher education in the United States.
Here, Europe lags badly, not because of a lack of talent, but because of a
lack of will and imagination. Let Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Lisbon, and
Thessaloníki become true magnets of world learning.
The economic burden of these and similar measures needs to be under-
stood carefully.It need not be,as many suppose,a matter of taxing Germans to
support the Portuguese. Rather, as there exist unemployed human capital
assets in Portugal, the appropriate step is to create a liability that will permit
employment in Portugal.A pension-supplement scheme—placing purchasing
power in the hands of the elderly in Portugal—will mobilize latent resources
in Portugal. It has no other important economic effects. In fact, there is no
need to tax Germans to do it. A deficit run at the European level is perfectly
justifiable,so long as overall unemployment exists at intolerable levels.The
interest on the deficit can be paid, in effect, from the eventual increase in
national income in Portugal.The burden will be light if the benefit is realized.
Beyond these examples of effective redistributive policy (which could
be multiplied, particularly by emulating the role of the nonprofit sector in
U.S. job creation), the larger problem of relative growth rates needs to be
addressed. This is substantially a macroeconomic problem and, accordingly,
a new and plainly Keynesian understanding is necessary of how aggregate
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The readily available macroeconomic policy instruments in Europe
are now reduced to a single measure: a lower interest rate. But there is no
way to impose low interest rate policy on the European Central Bank (ECB),
no very practical way to target the policy to the European periphery, and
no guarantee that lower interest rates (if they worked at all) would, in fact,
foment income convergence. If monetary stimulus were to help the rich
countries of Europe more than the poor, inequalities could rise.
The active role of monetary policy in a convergence strategy is therefore
somewhat limited.Indeed,convergence would be all too easy to reverse at any
time by raising interest rates and transferring income from debtors (the rela-
tively poor) to creditors (the relatively rich). This must be prevented. Rather
than relying on central bank policy to lead the process,a major strategic objec-
tive must be, simply, to limit the degree to which the ECB can undermine it.
And yet,the monetary front is not entirely barren.The euro has worked
(so far) for much of the periphery of Europe. The remarkable decline in
unemployment in Spain (from over 20 to approximately 8 percent) clearly
owes much to the disappearance of exchange-rate risk and interest-rate
convergence. In principle, these monetary policies reduce distortion in
favor of manufacturing activity in peripheral countries and absorb the
unemployed into better-paid service jobs,which now become creditworthy
in ways that they were not before. This approach took root in Spain as a
phenomenon similar, in some ways, to the American experience of the late
1990s. At that time, millions of new jobs were created in the United
States—not by lowering wages nor by deficit spending,but simply by mak-
ing credit available for next to nothing.
As already noted, some of the accession countries have recently
enjoyed a surge of foreign direct investment,whose benefits are transferred
to the whole population through a rise in the exchange rate. How far this
process will go remains to be seen, although obviously once countries join
the euro,it will stop.At that point,more direct policies will be needed to keep
the convergence process underway, and while the monetary mechanism
that brought such benefits to Spain might be repeated,it is not certain that it
will be, as the necessary financial institutions and credit market conditions
may not arise on their own.
And so I turn to fiscal policy proper. An effective, targeted, growth-
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such a way as to help reach the larger goals.This might be achieved by revis-
ing the Stability and Growth Pact. Permit the EU to run fiscal deficits and
issue euro bonds, which would support the incomes of lower-income per-
sons and regions, and the strategy of convergence. This is what the United
States usually does,or tries to do,in a slump.Such a radical change,however,
presupposes a development of European federalism and Keynesianism on
a scale that is not presently in the cards.
If the best policy—the most efficient route to fiscal expansion—is
barred,the same effect could be sought in other ways.An alternative would
be to rewrite the Stability and Growth Pact to permit anycountry of the EU
to run deficits greater than 3 percent—the current limit, excepted only in
deep recessions—so long as unemployment on average in Europe is higher
than a threshold value. The point here is that it does not matter which
country runs deficits and provides stimulus.Since the European economies
are integrated, the resource-using effects will be felt everywhere.And what
if, say, the Germans do not want to create full employment in Europe by
absorbing their own unemployed first and then attracting immigrants
from Spain or Poland? Well then, let the Spaniards or the Poles do it, and
let the Germans (directly, or indirectly through the ECB) hold the result-
ing bonds. Could German money build a great European university in
Portugal or Greece, or in Budapest or Sofia? Of course it could.
The threshold average value for unemployment in this scheme need not
be close to full employment. Any figure well below the present European
averages (for instance, 6 percent) would do. For it is a near certainty that,
once unemployment in Europe started decisively on a downward path, the
private sector’s demand for credit (and its perceived creditworthiness by
financial institutions) would rise. Before long, the resulting growth of pri-
vate deficits and debt would reduce the deficits of the public sector. The
problem for the authorities then would be merely to manage the flow of
funds, guarding against the emergence of bubbles and Ponzi schemes that
would make the expansion difficult or impossible to sustain.
Such was the experience of the United States in the late 1990s, when a
credit expansion, underpinned by fiscal federalism and a long-term, struc-
tural policy of interregional convergence, brought us to full employment
without inflation. It was a happy time, while it lasted. And it contains a
plethora of useful, unexpected, and unexploited lessons for Europe.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 43
Europe,which has not plunged itself into needless wars or grossly neg-
lected its public capital formation, is very well positioned to exploit these
lessons. They are just not the lessons that most Europeans expect to find
when casting a glance in the American direction. And Europeans will not
find them until they come to understand our actual circumstances far bet-
ter than conventional economics has taught them.Acknowledgments
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Appendix
1. Gini coefficients for earnings, measured across regions in Europe,
are computed by the following formula:
where:
• N is the number of regions
•
•
• is the average earnings of region j
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2. Economic sectors in the REGIO data set are given in Table A1.
Table A1 Economic Sectors
3. Convergence paths are calculated for each European region.
The convergence path for wages among 215 European regions over a 34-
year period (2007–2042) is set so that the dispersion of average wages
between European regions in 2042 becomes equal to the dispersion of aver-
age wages between the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia in 2001.
Four key assumptions underpin these calculations:
1. The present hierarchy of relation incomes between every sector of
every region in Europe remains strictly unchanged.The richest remain
the richest and the poorest the poorest.
2. Every gap between region-sector cells in 2042 remains exactly propor-
tional to its 2000 value.
3. The richest region-sector cell enjoys zero real wage growth between
now and 2042.
4. No structural change occurs in the balance of employment in any
region.




Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of
motor vehicles, motorcycles, and personal
and household goods 
Hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage, and communication
Financial intermediation
Real estate, renting, and business activities
Public administration and defense;
compulsory Social Security
Education
Health and social work
Other community, social, personal 
service activities
Private households with employed persons46 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
The calculations follow this procedure:
1. Compute the Gini coefficient for inequality of average pay across the
United States in 2001 (0.101).
2. Compute average annual wages, in thousands of euros, among 16
industries for 215 European regions in 2000 and the associated Gini
coefficient across the regions (0.235).
3. Compute average wages for each region-sector cell in 2000 (a total of
3,062) and rank them from high to low.
4. Take the ratio of the second highest to the highest region-sector cell,
the third highest to the second highest,and so forth,down to the ratio
of the lowest to the second lowest, for a total of 3,061 ratios.
5. Assume zero real wage growth in the richest region-sector cell between
now and 2042.
6. Choose the required ratio (convergence parameter) so that the
European interregional Gini coefficient in 2042 corresponds to the
U.S.value in 2000.The convergence parameter meeting this requirement
is 0.999822, meaning that the gap between each region-sector cell and
the one immediately below it is reduced by this ratio, each year.
7. Add sectors within regions to obtain new values for the average wages
in each region in 2042.
8. Compute the compound growth rate of average wages in each region
required to meet the convergence criterion in 2042.
Table A2 displays the results. For each European region, the table displays
average wages in 2000 (step 2), the required level of average wages in 2042
(step 7) necessary to meet the convergence criteria (step 6),and the associated
compound rate of wage growth necessary to meet the convergence criteria
under the stipulated conditions (step 8). Note that the present ranking of
regional average incomes is not preserved by this procedure; rather, the
present ranking of all sectors within regions is preserved. But regions with
a large fraction of sectors that are near,but not quite at the top of,the current
rankings may see their average incomes overtake those of the highest-income
regions;this is true for parts of the Netherlands and especially for inner London.Table A2 Convergence Paths for Each European Region* 
Code Region/Province Av Wage 2000+ Av Wage 2042+ Rate of Growth
De1 Baden-Württemberg 35.64 93.24 2.7%
De2 Bayern 33.89 92.30 2.8%
De3 Berlin 32.80 93.71 3.0%
De4 Brandenburg 25.97 86.54 3.4%
De5 Bremen 36.12 94.06 2.7%
De6 Hamburg 37.65 110.96 3.0%
De7 Hessen 35.61 94.21 2.7%
De8 Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 25.66 85.85 3.4%
De9 Niedersachsen 33.54 93.21 2.9%
Dea Nordrhein-Westfalen 35.27 94.29 2.8%
Deb Rheinland-Pfalz 33.36 91.33 2.8%
Dec Saarland 33.55 92.50 2.9%
Ded Sachsen 24.75 85.62 3.5%
Dee Sachsen-Anhalt 25.41 86.05 3.4%
Def Schleswig-Holstein 31.73 91.18 3.0%
Deg Thüringen 24.51 84.35 3.5%
Gr11 Anatoliki 
Makedonia, Thraki 17.62 74.66 4.1%
Gr12 Kentriki Makedonia 17.53 74.64 4.1%
Gr13 Dytiki Makedonia 19.32 74.79 3.8%
Gr14 Thessalia 17.86 74.55 4.0%
Gr21 Ipeiros 18.49 74.92 4.0%
Gr22 Ionia Nisia 17.79 74.45 4.1%
Gr23 Dytiki Ellada 17.54 74.22 4.1%
Gr24 Sterea Ellada 17.55 74.51 4.1%
Gr25 Peloponnisos 17.85 74.52 4.0%
Gr3 Attiki 18.36 74.57 4.0%
Gr41 Voreio Aigaio 18.54 75.70 4.0%
Gr42 Notio Aigaio 17.85 74.73 4.1%
Gr43 Kriti 17.32 74.39 4.1%
Es11 Galicia 14.03 75.98 4.8%
Es12 Principado de Asturias 17.91 77.82 4.2%
Es13 Cantabria 18.52 77.51 4.1%
Es21 Pais Vasco 22.64 81.55 3.6%
Es22 Comunidad 
Foral de Navarra 21.87 79.63 3.7%
Es23 La Rioja 19.29 78.10 4.0%
Es24 Aragón 20.12 78.98 3.9%
Es3 Comunidad de Madrid 23.17 80.70 3.5%
Es41 Castilla y León 18.96 77.99 4.0%
Es42 Castilla-la Mancha 16.79 77.25 4.3%
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Code Region/Province Av Wage 2000+ Av Wage 2042+ Rate of Growth
Es43 Extremadura 15.66 76.31 4.5%
Es51 Cataluña 19.71 78.53 3.9%
Es52 Comunidad Valenciana 16.77 76.06 4.3%
Es53 Illes Balears 18.80 77.61 4.0%
Es61 Andalucia 16.18 76.93 4.4%
Es62 Murcia 14.91 75.33 4.6%
Es63 Ceuta y Melilla 22.44 78.43 3.5%
Es7 Canarias (ES) 17.56 78.96 4.3%
Fr1 Île de France 43.69 117.61 2.8%
Fr21 Champagne-Ardenne 30.76 87.31 2.9%
Fr22 Picardie 30.01 85.10 2.9%
Fr23 Haute-Normandie 31.00 84.58 2.8%
Fr24 Centre 30.40 85.91 2.9%
Fr25 Basse-Normandie 27.73 83.11 3.1%
Fr26 Bourgogne 29.32 86.49 3.1%
Fr3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 30.50 84.65 2.9%
Fr41 Lorraine 30.40 94.36 3.2%
Fr42 Alsace 33.54 96.61 3.0%
Fr43 Franche-Comté 29.30 85.70 3.0%
Fr51 Pays de la Loire 28.63 85.07 3.1%
Fr52 Bretagne 28.53 86.14 3.1%
Fr53 Poitou-Charentes 28.08 85.53 3.1%
Fr61 Aquitaine 28.95 92.25 3.3%
Fr62 Midi-Pyrénées 29.70 86.89 3.0%
Fr63 Limousin 28.28 84.32 3.1%
Fr71 Rhône-Alpes 32.27 86.52 2.8%
Fr72 Auvergne 29.13 85.91 3.0%
Fr81 Languedoc-
Roussillon 27.97 84.36 3.1%
Fr82 Provence-Alpes
Côte d’Azur 31.60 87.64 2.9%
Fr83 Corse 31.36 87.94 2.9%
Ie01 Border, Midlands 
and Western 28.30 84.13 3.1%
Ie02 Southern and Eastern 30.79 87.88 3.0%
Itc1 Piemonte 28.82 84.51 3.0%
Itc2 Valle d’Aosta/
Vallée d’Aoste 29.62 85.85 3.0%
Itc3 Liguria 28.90 84.53 3.0%
Itc4 Lombardia 30.12 86.95 3.0%
Itd1 Prov. Autonoma 
Bolzano-Bozen No data available
Itd2 Prov. Autonoma 
Trento No data availableThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 49
Code Region/Province Av Wage 2000+ Av Wage 2042+ Rate of Growth
Itd3 Veneto 27.52 84.86 3.2%
Itd4 Friuli-
Venezia Giulia 28.28 84.57 3.1%
Itd5 Emilia-Romagna 28.53 85.41 3.1%
It1 Toscana 27.15 84.54 3.2%
It2 Umbria 25.86 83.39 3.3%
It3 Marche 26.25 83.82 3.3%
It4 Lazio 29.48 86.15 3.0%
Itf1 Abruzzo 25.75 83.00 3.3%
Itf2 Molise 27.17 83.95 3.2%
Itf3 Campania 25.44 81.99 3.3%
Itf4 Puglia 23.56 81.39 3.5%
Itf5 Basilicata 25.78 83.17 3.3%
Itf6 Calabria 23.16 81.02 3.5%
Itg1 Sicilia 25.50 82.65 3.3%
Itg2 Sardegna 25.64 82.82 3.3%
Nl11 Groningen 36.17 100.81 2.9%
Nl12 Friesland 33.48 99.60 3.1%
Nl13 Drenthe 33.76 99.48 3.0%
Nl21 Overijssel 34.09 99.70 3.0%
Nl22 Gelderland 35.15 93.39 2.8%
Nl23 Flevoland 33.70 92.06 2.8%
Nl31 Utrecht 38.27 94.50 2.5%
Nl32 Noord-Holland 38.11 102.97 2.8%
Nl33 Zuid-Holland 37.41 102.40 2.8%
Nl34 Zeeland 35.37 100.46 2.9%
Nl41 Noord-Brabant 35.16 100.72 3.0%
Nl42 Limburg (NL) 35.13 93.54 2.8%
At11 Burgenland 27.32 86.59 3.3%
At12 Niederösterreich 30.71 103.10 3.4%
At13 Vienna 39.70 131.94 3.4%
At21 Kärnten 29.60 95.54 3.3%
At22 Steiermark 28.77 94.08 3.3%
At31 Oberösterreich 32.36 97.10 3.1%
At32 Salzburg 30.97 96.46 3.2%
At33 Tirol 28.70 93.94 3.3%
At34 Vorarlberg 31.41 96.35 3.2%
Pt11 Norte 9.43 69.29 5.7%
Pt16 Centro (PT) 9.18 69.00 5.8%
Pt17 Lisboa 13.27 70.73 4.8%
Pt18 Alentejo 9.40 69.53 5.7%
Pt15 Algarve 9.43 69.18 5.7%
Pt20 Região Autónoma 
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Code Region/Province Av Wage 2000+ Av Wage 2042+ Rate of Growth
Pt30 Região Autónoma 
da Madeira (PT) 9.39 69.45 5.7%
Fi13 Itä-Suomi 23.17 79.51 3.5%
Fi14 Väli-Suomi 23.67 79.01 3.4%
Fi15 Pohjois-Suomi 25.38 80.85 3.3%
Fi16 Uusimaa (suuralue) 31.05 86.57 2.9%
Fi17 Etelä-Suomi 26.12 80.62 3.2%
Fi2 Åland 29.94 84.16 2.9%
Se01 Stockholm 42.12 102.78 2.5%
Se02 Östra Mellansverige 34.31 91.11 2.8%
Se04 Sydsverige 34.94 90.64 2.7%
Se06 Norra Mellansverige 33.05 90.64 2.8%
Se07 Mellersta Norrland 32.61 97.77 3.1%
Se08 Övre Norrland 32.77 90.43 2.9%
Se09 Småland med öarna 32.60 97.70 3.1%
Se0a Västsverige 34.57 96.93 2.9%
Be10 Région de Bruxelles 44.25 110.93 2.6%
Be21 Prov. Antwerpen 39.04 106.12 2.8%
Be22 Prov. Limburg (B) 33.50 101.81 3.1%
Be23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen 35.11 103.90 3.1%
Be24 Prov.Vlaams Brabant 40.58 107.68 2.7%
Be25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen 32.74 103.17 3.2%
Be31 Prov. Brabant Wallon 40.07 117.22 3.0%
Be32 Prov. Hainaut 33.87 94.59 2.9%
Be33 Prov. Liège 34.07 102.82 3.1%
Be34 Prov. Luxembourg (B) 31.26 93.17 3.1%
Be35 Prov. Namur 33.03 102.74 3.2%
Ukc1 Tees Valley and Durham 30.94 105.14 3.5%
Ukc2 Northumberland,
Tyne and Wear 30.11 96.63 3.3%
Ukd1 Cumbria 28.36 100.08 3.6%
Ukd2 Cheshire 32.85 106.14 3.3%
Ukd3 Greater Manchester 31.81 95.90 3.1%
Ukd4 Lancashire 30.90 95.17 3.2%
Ukd5 Merseyside 30.63 87.40 3.0%
Uke1 East Riding and 
North Lincolnshire 31.46 94.96 3.1%
Uke2 North Yorkshire 29.31 95.76 3.3%
Uke3 South Yorkshire 30.18 94.91 3.2%
Uke4 West Yorkshire 31.41 96.13 3.2%
Ukf1 Derbyshire and 
Nottinghamshire 32.97 108.11 3.4%
Ukf2 Leicestershire, Rutland,
and Northants 33.47 97.12 3.0%The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 51
Code Region/Province Av Wage 2000+ Av Wage 2042+ Rate of Growth
Ukf3 Lincolnshire 28.17 102.59 3.7%
Ukg1 Herefordshire,
Worcestershire,
and Warks 29.40 94.27 3.3%
Ukg2 Shropshire and 
Staffordshire 28.31 93.06 3.4%
Ukg3 West Midlands 32.40 105.13 3.3%
Ukh1 East Anglia 29.66 103.37 3.5%
Ukh2 Bedfordshire,
Hertfordshire 34.72 110.06 3.3%
Ukh3 Essex 30.13 90.41 3.1%
Uki1 Inner London 48.10 195.81 4.0%
Uki2 Outer London 37.34 129.69 3.5%
Ukj1 Berkshire, Bucks,
and Oxfordshire 36.94 123.14 3.4%
Ukj2 Surrey, East and 
West Sussex 31.56 108.09 3.5%
Ukj3 Hampshire and 
Isle of Wight 30.71 103.61 3.4%
Ukj4 Kent 31.52 131.51 4.0%
Ukk1 Gloucestershire,
Wiltshire, and 
North Somerset 31.56 105.50 3.4%
Ukk2 Dorset and Somerset 28.57 103.64 3.6%
Ukk3 Cornwall and 
Isles of Scilly 23.56 81.72 3.5%
Ukk4 Devon 28.45 111.27 3.9%
Ukl1 West Wales and 
The Valleys 29.92 104.37 3.5%
Ukl2 East Wales 32.03 116.48 3.7%
Ukm1 North Eastern Scotland 34.61 106.07 3.2%
Ukm2 Eastern Scotland 31.92 97.67 3.2%
Ukm3 South Western Scotland 31.20 96.42 3.2%
Ukm4 Highlands and Islands 25.59 100.08 3.9%
Ukn0 Northern Ireland 28.42 104.05 3.7%
Cz01 Praha 10.42 67.42 5.3%
Cz02 Strední Cechy 6.47 64.66 6.6%
Cz03 Jihozápad 6.09 65.32 6.8%
Cz04 Severozápad 5.85 64.50 6.9%
Cz05 Severov´ ychod 5.89 64.65 6.9%
Cz06 Jihov´ ychod 5.93 64.55 6.9%
Cz07 Strední Morava 5.70 64.22 7.0%
Cz08 Moravskoslezko 6.18 64.55 6.7%
Hu1 Közép-Magyarország 9.29 66.88 5.6%Code Region/Province Av Wage 2000+ Av Wage 2042+ Rate of Growth
Hu21 Közép-Dunántúl 6.38 64.55 6.6%
Hu22 Nyugat-Dunántúl 6.09 64.23 6.8%
Hu23 Dél-Dunántúl 5.53 64.25 7.0%
Hu31 Észak-Magyarország 5.71 64.11 6.9%
Hu32 Észak-Alföld 5.30 64.28 7.2%
Hu33 Dél-Alföld 5.26 63.83 7.2%
Pl11 Lódzkie 7.24 67.48 6.4%
Pl12 Mazowieckie 10.18 68.84 5.5%
Pl21 Malopolskie 7.51 67.24 6.3%
Pl22 Slaskie 8.25 66.70 6.0%
Pl31 Lubelskie 7.35 67.06 6.3%
Pl32 Podkarpackie 7.27 66.38 6.3%
Pl33 Swietokrzyskie 7.37 66.40 6.3%
Pl34 Podlaskie 7.40 66.34 6.3%
Pl41 Wielkopolskie 7.54 66.79 6.2%
Pl42 Zachodniopomorskie 7.05 65.86 6.4%
Pl43 Lubuskie 7.14 67.08 6.4%
Pl51 Dolnoslaskie 7.84 66.76 6.1%
Pl52 Opolskie 7.66 66.76 6.2%
Pl61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 7.22 65.92 6.3%
Pl62 Warminsko-Mazurskie 7.21 66.38 6.4%
Pl63 Pomorskie 7.74 66.63 6.2%
Sk01 Bratislavsk´ y 7.74 66.18 6.1%
Sk02 Západné Slovensko 5.10 64.04 7.3%
Sk03 Stredné Slovensko 5.14 64.77 7.3%
Sk04 V´ ychodné Slovensko 4.98 64.12 7.4%
* excluding Denmark
+ in thousands of euros
Notes
1. To the untutored, a claim that serious monopoly power is held by the
mass of low-paid, unskilled workers may seem strange. One might
think that market power would accumulate in the hands of, well,
monopolies; that the benefits of monopoly are more likely to be found
in the stock options of executives than in the pay packets of the assem-
bly line. But to think this way is to misunderstand the logic of supply
and demand. Given that there is unemployment, it must be the case
that real wages are too high.And this proves (without further recourse
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to evidence) that the problem of monopoly is a problem of worker
power. Conversely, no chief executive is ever fired for demanding too
much money, proof that the market for CEOs clears at the competi-
tive price. In some matters, it may be better to remain untutored.
2. This possibility led later to great debates over adaptive and rational
expectations, and to the counterargument that any effort to generate a
little inflation would necessarily spin out of control. It is hard to take
that view too seriously anymore; a more cogent objection to Keynes's
remedy is that today's economy has a hard time generating inflation at
all. But then, of course, no barrier exists to the direct provision of the
needed jobs through fiscal policy or an employer-of-last-resort scheme.
3. A familiar argument holds that redistribution from higher to lower
incomes raises the propensity to consume, but this is arguably a weak
effect and is not part of the case being made here.
4. Similar patterns can be found in broader measures of pay encompass-
ing the service sector, but computational difficulties are greater.
5. Hourly pay inequalities within industries in the United States may be
larger than indicated by the data, thus blunting the intersectoral com-
parison. (Obvious examples of pay inequalities are the well-known
abuses of CEO pay.) My experience with these comparisons is that the
same order of difference prevails within and between industries.
Another reason why U.S. unemployment fell so far below European
levels may lie in superior search mechanisms in the language-unified and
computerized United States. It may be easier for low-wage service
workers in America than in Europe to search for better jobs without
actually leaving their current ones.To the extent that this is true,the U.S.
service sector may be sheltering many underemployed people who would
be openly unemployed in Europe.However,I do not have estimates,or
know whether underemployment is worse than unemployment.
6. For the EU–15 alone,the interregional Gini coefficient comes to 0.142,
which is still 40 percent higher than in the United States.
7. To test the impact of the missing data for Germany, I estimated the
missing observations by assuming that the wages and employment in
German regions by sector bear the same relationship as those in
France. The simulations did not change significantly, so my calcula-
tions here do not include this adjustment.54 Public Policy Brief, No. 87
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